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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
KASSANDRA NICOLE YOUNG, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 46755-2019
ADA COUNTY NO. CR-FE-2016-205
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
After six weeks on a “rider,” rider program staff recommended the district court
relinquish jurisdiction in Kassandra Nicole Young’s case, based on a single DOR. The district
court then relinquished jurisdiction and executed Ms. Young’s sentence for felony possession of
a controlled substance. On appeal, Ms. Young asserts the district court abused its discretion
when it relinquished jurisdiction.
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
A Garden City Police Department officer stopped a car driven by Ms. Young for failure
to use a turn signal. (See Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.)1 Ms. Young initially
identified herself as “Latisha Smith,” and reported she did not have a driver’s license and could
not produce proof of insurance. (PSI, p.3.) One of the two passengers in the car had a concealed
handgun without a permit, and officers detained that passenger and removed Ms. Young and the
other passenger from the car. (See PSI, pp.3, 45-46.) Officers then had a drug dog conduct a
plain air sniff on the car, and the dog alerted. (PSI, p.3.) Inside the car, officers found a purse
containing Ms. Young’s identification card, cash, a glass pipe, and a bag containing a crystal-like
substance that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine. (See PSI, pp.3-4.)
The State charged Ms. Young by Information with possession of a controlled substance,
felony, I.C. § 37-2732(c), possession of drug paraphernalia, misdemeanor, I.C. § 37-2734A,
providing false information to law enforcement, misdemeanor, I.C. § 18-5413(2), and driving
without obtaining a driver’s license, misdemeanor, I.C. § 49-301. (R., pp.28-29.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Ms. Young agreed to plead guilty to amended charges of felony possession of a
controlled substance and misdemeanor providing false information to law enforcement.
(R., pp.34-44.) For possession of a controlled substance, the district court imposed a unified
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Ms. Young on
probation for a period of seven years. (R., pp.51-56.)
About four months later, the State filed a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation
Violation, alleging Ms. Young had violated her probation. (R., pp.59-61; see R., pp.72-74
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All citations to “PSI” refer to the 93-page PDF version of the Presentence Report and its
attachments. Please note that not all pages of the PDF contain sequential page numbers.
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(Amended Motion for Probation Violation).) Ms. Young admitted to violating her probation by
committing the new crime of misdemeanor battery, not submitting to a urinalysis test, consuming
an alcoholic beverage, committing another new crime of misdemeanor battery, not participating
in rehabilitation programs, and using amphetamine and/or methamphetamine. (See R., pp.73-74,
83.) The district court subsequently revoked Ms. Young’s probation, executed her sentence, and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.85-87.) After Ms. Young participated in a rider, and rider program
staff recommended the district court consider placing her on a period of supervised probation,
the district court suspended the sentence and placed her on probation for a new period of seven
years. (PSI, pp.69, 76; R., pp.88, 90-96.)
Some nine months later, the State filed a Motion for Bench Warrant for Probation
Violation, alleging Ms. Young had violated her probation. (R., pp.99-101.) Ms. Young admitted
to violating her probation by committing the new crime of felony possession of a controlled
substance. (See R., pp.100, 115.) The district court then revoked her probation, executed her
sentence, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.117-19.)
Ms. Young was placed in an Advanced Practices rider. (R., p.120.) About six weeks
after her arrival at the rider facility, rider program staff recommended the district court consider
relinquishing jurisdiction. (PSI, pp.83, 88.) The Addendum to the Presentence Report (APSI)
stated that Ms. Young had a Class II DOR for harassment, related to aggressive statements and
behavior she reportedly directed towards another rider participant. (See PSI, pp.85-86.) Rider
program staff recommended the district court relinquish jurisdiction based on that DOR. (See
PSI, p.87.) She did not have any other disciplinary corrective actions. (PSI, p.86.)
At the rider review hearing, Ms. Young’s counsel asked the district court “not to
relinquish jurisdiction, to order the Department of Corrections to continue programming
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Ms. Young.”

(Tr., p.12, Ls.3-6.)2

The State recommended the district court relinquish

jurisdiction. (Tr., p.11, L.20 – p.12, L.1.) The district court relinquished jurisdiction and
executed Ms. Young’s sentence. (R., pp.123-24.)
Ms. Young filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order Relinquishing
Jurisdiction. (R., pp.125-27.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Relinquished Jurisdiction
Ms. Young asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished
jurisdiction. An appellate court reviews a district court’s decision to relinquish jurisdiction for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998). The district court’s
discretion in deciding whether to relinquish jurisdiction is not limitless. State v. Rhoades, 122
Idaho 837, 837 (Ct. App. 1992).
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the trial
court: (1) correctly perceived the issues as one of discretion; (2) acted within the
outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by
the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018). The principal purpose of retained
jurisdiction is to provide a period of evaluation of the offender’s potential for rehabilitation and
suitability for probation. State v. Petersen, 149 Idaho 808, 812 (Ct. App. 2010).
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Please note that not all pages of the Reporter’s Transcript contain individual sequential
page numbers.
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Here, the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction, because
Ms. Young’s overall performance on her rider did not demonstrate she lacked potential for
rehabilitation and suitability for probation. As Ms. Young’s counsel asserted during the rider
review hearing, the APSI “bears out that she wasn’t placed in much programming.” (See Tr.,
p.12, Ls.6-7.)

Counsel told the district court Ms. Young had indicated that “toward the

beginning of the program, there were two weeks where the Department refused to program
anybody in her unit due to some behavioral issues related to some other folks.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.912.) As of the date of the APSI, Ms. Young had been in the Advanced Practices program for
only about three weeks, and the facilitator reported that even if her work lacked depth, she was
completing her work. (See PSI, pp.86-87.)
The APSI also did not provide a complete picture of the DOR that led to rider program
staff recommending that the district court relinquish jurisdiction. At the rider review hearing,
Ms. Young’s counsel informed the district court that Ms. Young had indicated “that the other
inmate was making comments about her children and that set her off.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.15-17.)
However, the APSI “seems to suggest that Ms. Young just started behaving inappropriately and
making comments that were completely out of left field and unwarranted.” (Tr., p.12, Ls.20-23.)
According to defense counsel, the other rider participant later “expressed that she no longer had
any fear of Ms. Young,” and Ms. Young had indicated the other participant “had signed a paper
acknowledging that she was fine being housed around her again.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.6-12.)
Additionally, defense counsel related that Ms. Young “acknowledges there is a better
way to handle her anger than how she went about that situation.”

(Tr., p.12, Ls.17-19.)

Ms. Young told the district court, “I felt like I could have handled the situation a lot differently
given the fact that I have been on a rider before and I do know the skills that I should have used,
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which I did neglect to use those at first.” (Tr., p.14, L.25 – p.15, L.5.) She stated, “I tried to use
them, and it wasn’t going that way.” (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-6.)
Moreover, Ms. Young’s counsel stated that, after Ms. Young’s placement at the Elmore
County Jail while awaiting her rider review, “she’s been enrolled on a programming tract at the
jail at Elmore County that involves parenting classes, life skills, a relapse type of program, and
addresses some anger management issues as well.” (Tr., p.13, Ls.13-19.) She was also an
inmate worker at the Elmore County jail. (Tr., p.13, Ls.22-23.)
In light of the above, and despite her single DOR, Ms. Young’s overall performance on
her rider did not demonstrate she lacked potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation.
Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction.

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Ms. Young respectfully requests that this Court reduce her
sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 6th day of June, 2019.
/s/ Ben P. McGreevy
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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